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JUSTICE ROBERT UTTER, THE SUPREME COURT OF
WASHINGTON, AND THE NEW JUDICIAL
FEDERALISM: JUDGING AND TEACHING*
Robert F. Williams**
The structural integrity of our federal system depends upon
state constitutions and state courts providing an independent
guaranty of individual rights. While the system’s state
constitutional component was in danger of being overwhelmed
by its national counterpart, the danger has subsided with the
recent rediscovery of the rich heritage and unique protections
offered by our state constitutions. The trend towards
development of a principled body of state constitutional law
needs nurturing if it is to continue to spread and mature. Each
component of a state’s legal system—state bar, law schools, and
judiciary—bears a measure of responsibility for breathing life
into a state constitution.
Practitioners, students, and law faculty each have a unique
role to play in the rebirthing process.1
– Justice Robert F. Utter and Sanford E. Pitler, Clerk to Justice Utter,
Supreme Court of Washington
INTRODUCTION
Robert Utter was appointed to the Supreme Court of Washington in
1971, at age 41, after a successful career as a trial and intermediate

* This is an expanded version of a talk given at a conference in Seattle, Washington organized by
Professor Hugh Spitzer, an accomplished state constitutional law scholar, to honor the contributions
of Justice Robert Utter to the field of state constitutional law, both in Washington State and the
nation.
** Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers University Law School; Associate Director, Center for
State Constitutional Studies, www.camlaw.rutgers.edu/statecon/.
1. Robert F. Utter & Sanford E. Pitler, Presenting a State Constitutional Argument: Comment on
Theory and Technique, 20 IND. L. REV. 635, 677 (1987).
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appeals court judge.2 This was a period when state supreme courts were
undergoing an important transformation in their workload. A detailed
study of that transformation concluded, in 1977, that state supreme court
justices: “have come to view their role less conservatively. They seem to
be less concerned with the stabilization and protection of property rights,
more concerned with the individual and the downtrodden, and more
willing to consider rulings that promote social change.”3
A number of factors contributed to this change, including the fact that
this generation of state judges had watched the Warren Court at work,4
and was freed up to accept only the most important cases after the
advent of intermediate appeals courts.5
The 1970s also brought on the “New Judicial Federalism,” a
movement in which state supreme courts began to recognize that state
constitutional rights provisions could be applied to provide more
protection than recognized by the United States Supreme Court under
the federal Constitution.6 This important element of American
constitutionalism had always been true, but it began to be highlighted in
academic writing in the 1960s.7 The most important factor was the 1977
Harvard Law Review article by Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., where he
called on state court judges to “step into the breach” and interpret their
state constitutions to protect individual liberties even as the United
States Supreme Court became more conservative.8
I have previously referred to this early chapter in the New Judicial
2. CHARLES H. SHELDON, A CENTURY OF JUDGING: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE WASHINGTON
SUPREME COURT 166 (1988) [hereinafter SHELDON, CENTURY OF JUDGING] (“Utter had not known
the governor well and had not been active in party affairs, although a life-long Republican.
Nonetheless, he had developed a reputation as an innovative and reform-minded judge. He began
his judicial career as a commissioner for the King County Juvenile Court in 1959. Five years later
he was elected to the Superior Court. His efforts on behalf of juvenile rehabilitation and reform
were widely recognized.”); see also CHARLES H. SHELDON, THE WASHINGTON HIGH BENCH: A
BIOGRAPHICAL HISTORY OF THE STATE SUPREME COURT, 1889-1991, at 333 (1992) [hereinafter
SHELDON, HIGH BENCH] (short biography of Justice Utter).
3. Robert A. Kagan, Bliss Cartwright, Lawrence M. Friedman & Stanton Wheeler, The Business
of State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970, 30 STAN. L. REV. 121, 155 (1977); see also SHELDON, HIGH
BENCH, supra note 2, at 19; SHELDON, CENTURY OF JUDGING, supra note 2, at 238, 340.
4. G. Alan Tarr, The Past and Future of the New Judicial Federalism, 24 PUBLIUS: J.
FEDERALISM 63, 72–73 (1994).
5. This was true in Washington. See SHELDON, CENTURY OF JUDGING, supra note 2, at 227–28,
305–06.
6. ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 113 (2009).
7. Robert F. Williams, Foreword: Looking Back at the New Judicial Federalism’s First
Generation, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. vii, xiii (1996); WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 121.
8. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV.
L. REV. 489, 503 (1977).
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Federalism as “The First Stage: The Thrill of Discovery.”9 Again,
although the possibility of state constitutional rights above the national
minimum standard of the Federal Constitution was a truism, there
nevertheless was a feeling of the “thrill of discovery” during the 1970s
and 1980s.10 Justice Utter’s many contributions to this discussion, both
on and off the bench, were central to this development which Justice
Brennan called the “most important development in constitutional
jurisprudence in our times.”11 Together with state supreme court justices
such as Stanley Mosk of California,12 Hans Linde of Oregon,13 Shirley
Abrahamson of Wisconsin,14 Ellen Peters of Connecticut,15 and Stewart
Pollock of New Jersey,16 Justice Utter provided the judicial seal of
approval for this recently re-discovered phenomenon.
I.

JUSTICE UTTER’S BROAD ACADEMIC IMPACT

Justice Utter served not only as a Supreme Court justice, but also as
an important teacher for lawyers, judges, law professors, and political
scientists about this new dimension of American constitutionalism. In
fact, he taught Washington State’s first course on state constitutional law
at the University of Puget Sound Law School (now Seattle University
Law School),17 and later courses at the other two law schools in the state
9. Robert F. Williams, Introduction: The Third Stage of the New Judicial Federalism, 59 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 211, 213 (2003); WILLIAMS supra note 6, at 119.
10. Williams, supra note 9, at 213; WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 119.
11. See G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 165 (1998).
12. See, e.g., Stanley Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and Conservative, 63 TEX. L.
REV. 1081 (1985).
13. See, e.g., Hans A. Linde, Without “Due Process”: Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49 OR. L.
REV. 125 (1970); Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States’ Bills of Rights, 9 U.
BALT. L. REV. 379 (1980).
14. See, e.g., Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of
State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1141 (1985).
15. See, e.g., Ellen A. Peters, State Constitutional Law: Federalism in the Common Law
Tradition, 84 MICH. L. REV. 583 (1986) (reviewing DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW (Bradley D. McGraw ed., 1985)).
16. Stewart G. Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35
RUTGERS L. REV. 707 (1983).
17. SHELDON, HIGH BENCH, supra note 2, at 336 (“Justice Utter has earned a national
reputation for his scholarly applications of state constitutional law.”).
Utter has built a solid reputation on the supreme court as an innovative jurist, creatively
mixing elements of conservatism with liberalism, defying common ideological designation. On
the one hand, he is a constitutional intentionist, usually associated with conservative
restraintists: the intent of the framers of the state constitution should be determined and applied
in constitutional cases despite the demands of the current situation. In a number of such
decisions the freedoms given individuals exceed those granted by the U.S. Supreme Court. For
example, Utter maintains that the founders intended in Article 1, Section 7 of the Declaration
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were directly modeled on his syllabus.18 He coauthored, with Hugh
Spitzer, The Washington State Constitution: A Reference Guide,19 one of
a fifty-state series. This became the go-to source for the history and
judicial interpretation of the Washington State constitution.
When I was first seeking a publisher for my casebook on state
constitutional law, now in its fifth edition, and seeking support for the
idea, Justice Utter wrote to me in 1985:
One of the things I have observed is the lack of a textbook that
would allow students and lawyers to view the subject in a
systematic way. In a few states law review articles have been
written which present a survey of that state’s law, but these
states are in the minority and they would benefit, as well, by a
national overview of the subject.
In short, I support the idea of your book wholeheartedly. I
believe there is a demonstrated need for it, and that conditions
have changed so much in the last three years that, what may
have been a questionable need then, is no longer in question.20
This kind of support from the state bench for a law school course
book proved invaluable.
Justice Utter made a presentation to the 1983 Annual Fall Judicial
Conference in Washington on state constitutional rights adjudication,21
refined the presentation for a national audience at the 1984 Williamsburg

of Rights to protect the private affairs of persons and, consequently, to place greater
restrictions on the intrusions of the state into one’s privacy than the Bill of Rights of the U.S.
Constitution requires with its absence of direct reference to the right of privacy.
On the other hand, his historical analysis of the meaning of the state constitution leads him
to fear not only governmental but also private transgressions into individual freedom. State
action is not a requisite for court intervention, according to justice’s version of the state’s
fundamental law. Thus, his conservative intentionist reading of the constitution often leads to
liberal results. Such an apparent confusion of ideological labels lends credence to Utter’s
contention that when applied to him the labels are too confining because they don’t describe
the dynamics of what you’re working with . . . . I believe that my views are really constantly
evolving.”
Id. at 335.
18. Letter from Hugh Spitzer, Professor, Univ. of Wash. Sch. of Law, to Charlotte Lunday, Exec.
Online Editor, Wash. Law Review (Aug. 28, 2015) (on file with Washington Law Review); Letter
from Justice Debra Stephens, Supreme Court of Wash., to Charlotte Lunday, Exec. Online Editor,
Wash. Law Review (Nov. 5, 2015) (on file with Washington Law Review).
19. ROBERT F. UTTER & HUGH SPITZER, THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION: A
REFERENCE GUIDE (2002).
20. Letter to author from Robert F. Utter, Wash. State Supreme Court Justice (April 22, 1985) (on
file with author). He knew I would attach his letter to my proposal to publishers.
21. See Justice Robert F. Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System: Perspectives on
State Constitutions and the Washington Declaration of Rights, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 491, 491
n* (1984) [hereinafter Utter, Freedom and Diversity].
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conference,22 then published it in the University of Puget Sound Law
Review,23 and finally included it in the published proceedings of the
Williamsburg Conference.24 This work reached four different audiences,
and presented an early survey of almost all of the issues that would
occur in state constitutional rights adjudication. It was extremely
prescient in anticipating all of the big issues in state constitutional law
such as lockstepping, the state action doctrine, use of state constitutional
convention records, the adequate and independent state ground doctrine,
and many others. As always, he was well aware of the interaction of
state constitutional law with the Federal Constitution.
This veritable explosion of state constitutional law scholarship
continued in his next article.25 Echoing his plurality opinion in the
important Alderwood Associates v. Washington Environmental Council26
case, this article is an early and deep analysis of the issue of free speech
and association on private property, where federal First Amendment
protections do not apply because of the absence of state action.27 The
questions surrounding the requirement of state action, or a reduced level
of state action, in state constitutional law are extremely important.
Justice Utter also authored two exhaustive surveys of Washington State
constitutional search and seizure law.28
22. See Robert F. Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System: Perspectives on State
Constitutions and the Washington Declaration of Rights, in DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 239 (Bradley D. McGraw ed., 1985).
To provide a forum for examining this rapidly emerging body of law and for improving
communication among the states, the Conference of Chief Justices, National Center for State
Courts, and Marshall-Wythe School of Law of the College of William and Mary organized a
National Conference on Developments in State Constitutional Law, which was held in March
1984, in Williamsburg, Virginia. That conference, which was attended by justices representing
over thirty state supreme courts and by numerous constitutional law scholars, attorneys, and
others, led to this collection of essays.
DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra, at VII.
23. Utter, Freedom and Diversity, supra note 21.
24. See DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 22.
25. Justice Robert F. Utter, The Right to Speak, Write, and Publish Freely: State Constitutional
Protection Against Private Abridgment, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 157 (1985) [hereinafter Utter,
Right to Speak].
26. 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P. 2d 108 (1981).
27. Utter, Right to Speak, supra note 25.
28. Justice Robert F. Utter, Survey of Washington Search and Seizure Law, 9 U. PUGET SOUND L.
REV. 1 (1985); Justice Robert F. Utter, Survey of Washington Search and Seizure Law: 1988
Update, 11 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 411 (1988). These important surveys have been updated three
times by Washington Supreme Court Justice Charles Johnson, who took over Justice Utter’s class at
Seattle University Law School. See Charles W. Johnson & Debra L. Stephens, Survey of
Washington Search and Seizure Law: 2013 Update, SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1581 (2013); Charles W.
Johnson, Survey of Washington State Search and Seizure Law: 2005 Update, 28 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 467 (2005); Charles W. Johnson, Survey of Washington Search and Seizure Law: 1998
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While serving as the Distinguished Jurist-in-Residence at the Indiana
University School of Law—Indianapolis in 1987, Justice Utter
acquainted the law students of his wide knowledge of state constitutional
law in a lecture and later Article aimed at practitioners and future
practitioners.29 Five years later, he described the slow rise in awareness
of state constitutional law in his State of Washington:
When I graduated from law school in 1954, there was no
discussion of state constitutional law and only marginal
discussion of the Bill of Rights. It was not until the late 1970s,
some nine years after I first joined the Washington State
Supreme Court, that parties in cases before us even began
arguing for a principled basis for developing and discussing
state constitutional law. . . . Even today, progress is slow. In
Washington state, with three excellent law schools, there is still
only one, University of Puget Sound Law School, that regularly
offers a seminar course in state constitutional law. The two other
law schools have interwoven portions of state constitutional law
analysis into relevant classes, but offer no course focusing on
state constitutional law theory and history.30
In this same Article, Justice Utter joined the academic debate on the
legitimacy of independent state constitutional rights adjudication,
responding to the well-known challenge by Professor James Gardner,
where he criticized state constitutional law cases as being without
substance and state constitutions themselves as not really
“constitutional.”31 He further provided a spirited defense of the Supreme
Court of Washington’s “criteria approach” to state constitutional rights
arguments when there is a similar federal constitutional provision in

Update, 22 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 337 (1998).
29. Utter & Pitler, supra note 1.
30. Justice Robert F. Utter, The Practice of Principled Decision-Making in State
Constitutionalism: Washington’s Experience, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1153, 1155–56 (1992) [hereinafter
Utter, Principled Decision-Making]. “Five years later the challenge is still the same. If lawyers,
students, faculty, and judges take their roles seriously, a principled development of state
constitutional law in which a meaningful constitutional discourse takes place is inevitable.” Id. at
1167. Later, the University of Washington, in 1996, and Gonzaga, in the late 1990s, added state
constitutional law courses modeled on Justice Utter’s course at the University of Puget Sound.
Letter from Hugh Spitzer, Professor, Univ. of Wash. Sch. of Law, to Charlotte Lunday, Exec.
Online Editor, Wash. Law Review (Aug. 28, 2015) (on file with Washington Law Review), Letter
from Justice Debra Stephens, Supreme Court of Wash., to Charlotte Lunday, Exec. Online Editor,
Wash. Law Review (Nov. 5, 2015) (on file with Washington Law Review).
31. James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761
(1992); see also First Covenant Church v. Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d 203, 234–35, 840 P.2d 174, 191
(1992) (Utter, J., concurring) (citing Gardner, supra).
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State v. Gunwall.32 In the 1986 Gunwall case, the Court set forth factors
that could help guide the courts and lawyers in applying independent
state constitutional interpretations.33 Justice Utter strongly defended this
approach in 1989 in Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp.,34 a case relying solely on
Washington’s constitution to overturn legislation diminishing the jury’s
role in damage actions.35
As with his in-depth analysis of free speech and expression on private
property,36 Justice Utter also provided a very detailed analysis of church
and state issues in Washington as well as in a national context.37 It was a
vigorous call for protection of the free exercise of religion. He wrote
convincingly about the role of judicial independence in state
constitutional rights adjudication,38 and further contended that state
courts should provide interpretations of federal constitutional rights even
if they are basing their holdings on similar or identical state
constitutional provisions.39 In all of his academic writings Justice Utter
was careful to give credit to his law clerks and interns.40 He had clerked
on the Washington State Supreme Court himself.
Taken together, Justice Utter’s academic writings could have formed
the basis for an influential book that would still be useful today in
Washington and across the country. In my teaching, scholarship and
advocacy I return to his body of work often. For example, when I was
working on an Article concerning “lockstepping,” where state courts
interpret their state constitutional provisions as identical or
32. 106 Wash. 2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986); see also Hugh D. Spitzer, New Life for the “Criteria
Tests” in State Constitutional Jurisprudence: “Gunwall is Dead—Long Live Gunwall!” 37
RUTGERS L.J. 1169 (2006); Utter, Principled Decision-Making supra note 30, at 1161–66.
33. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d at 61–62, 720 P.2d at 812.
34. 112 Wash. 2d 636, 663, 771 P.2d 711, 725 (1989). I have been critical of the “criteria
approach, even though it provides an excellent template for advocates, because it can be read to
create a presumption that United States Supreme Court interpretations should be applied to state
constitutions in the absence of one of the criteria.” WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 146. Justice Utter
made it clear that the Gunwall factors were “non exclusive” in his Sofie opinion. Sofie, 112 Wash.
2d at 663, 771 P.2d at 725.
35. Sofie, 112 Wash. 2d at 636, 771 P.2d at 711.
36. Utter, Right to Speak, supra note 25.
37. Robert F. Utter & Edward J. Larson, Church and State on the Frontier: The History of the
Establishment Clauses in the Washington State Constitution, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 451 (1988).
38. Robert F. Utter, State Constitutional Law, The United States Supreme Court, and Democratic
Accountability: Is There a Crocodile in the Bathtub?, 64 WASH. L. REV. 19 (1989).
39. Robert F. Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile: State Court Comment on Federal
Constitutional Issues When Disposing of Cases on State Constitutional Grounds, 63 TEX. L. REV.
1025 (1985).
40. For a listing of Justice Utter’s law clerks, see SHELDON, HIGH BENCH, supra note 2, at 368–
74.
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“coextensive,” with the United States Supreme Court’s interpretations of
the Federal Constitution,41 I quoted Justice Utter’s criticism of state
court decisions purporting to link state and federal constitutional
interpretation in the future (“prospective lockstepping”) as a virtual
“rewrite” of the state constitution without a constitutional convention or
the people’s consent.42 He had also said, more broadly:
In addition, one should be neither ignorant of nor intimidated by
the case law and doctrines that may be cited by parties opposing
independent interpretation. In most cases the problems they
present can and should be overcome. For example, a number of
Washington cases contain dicta, and sometimes actual holdings,
to the effect that provisions of our constitution should be
interpreted in exactly the same way that the federal courts
interpret the federal Constitution, unless a very good reason for
variance can be shown. While the Washington Supreme Court’s
holdings must of course be followed unless overturned by that
court, it is clear from a number of more recent cases
that . . . .supreme court pronouncements should be scrutinized to
determine whether they constitute actual holdings and, if not,
whether they were based on assumptions that are no longer
valid.43
II.

JUSTICE UTTER’S STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
OPINIONS

Justice Utter’s 1981 plurality opinion in Alderwood Associates v.
Washington Environmental Council provided a primer on the
relationship between federal and state constitutional law in the area of
free speech and association for the gathering of initiative signatures on
private shopping mall property.44 There was an obvious connection
between his writing on and off the bench,45 and he was teaching in both
capacities. In Alderwood Associates, he made clear that there were good
reasons for state courts to consider interpreting their constitutions to be
more protective than the United States Supreme Court’s federal “floor”:
When the United States Supreme Court interprets the Fourteenth

41. Robert F. Williams, State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doctrine: Case-by-Case
Adoptionism or Prospective Lockstepping? 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1499 (2005).
42. State v. Smith, 117 Wash. 2d 263, 281–82, 814 P.2d 652, 661 (1991) (Utter, J., concurring).
43. Utter, Freedom and Diversity, supra note 21, at 507.
44. 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d 108 (1981).
45. See, e.g., Utter, Freedom and Diversity, supra note 21.
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Amendment, it establishes a rule for the entire country. . . . The
court must thus establish a rule which accounts for all the
variations from state to state and region to region. The rule must
operate acceptably in all areas of the nation and hence it
invariably represents the lowest common denominator.46
He continued by observing: “[f]ederalism prevents the court from
adopting a rule which prevents states from experimenting.”47 In holding
that citizens could gather signatures for initiative petitions in private
shopping malls, Justice Utter was careful to observe that this ruling was
limited because “[i]f there were no limitations to their application, every
private conflict involving speech and property rights would become a
constitutional dispute.”48
Justice Utter’s colleague on the State Supreme Court, Justice Charles
W. Johnson, had this to say about him:
Utter’s development of an independent interpretation of the
State Constitution was probably as strong an influence on this
court as could have been achieved by any individual. It was not
a philosophy embraced by everyone because it’s not a
comfortable philosophy. But the way Bob explained it in his
writing was persuasive. As lawyers and judges, we’re most
comfortable with the federal Constitution. That’s what we’re
taught in law school. We’re not exposed to the State
Constitution if we’re practicing law or judging at the lower court
level. . . . What Bob Utter did before I came on the court was
develop a language, or at least a foundation of the principles that
explained not only what these words meant to the drafters but
how they should be applied. And it made sense. . . . The door
was not closed to the state constitutional interpretation because
Bob Utter had kept it open.49
Justice Utter was called on to author opinions in a wide range of state
constitutional law matters beyond individual rights.
Early in Justice Utter’s tenure on the Washington State Supreme
Court he had occasion to inquire deeply into the inherent power of state
high courts to order adequate funding for their constitutional

46. Alderwood Assoc., 96 Wash. 2d at 242, 635 P.2d at 115 (citing Project Report: Toward an
Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 271, 290 (1973)).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Robert F. Utter: Justice’s Sailor, WASH. SECRETARY ST., https://www.sos.wa.gov/
legacyproject/oralhistories/RobertUtter/ [https://perma.cc/8SSK-CG7S] (last visited Oct. 18, 2015)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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responsibilities.50 After thorough research and analysis he concluded that
the Washington Court had such inherent power to defend itself, but
expressed humility in the exercise of such power by finding that the
heavy burden had not been met.51
Justice Utter did not miss the circumstances where subconstitutional
legal sources such as statutes might provide important rights
protections.52 In State v. Wanrow,53 for example, after performing a
detailed statutory interpretation, he concluded that a taped “private
communication” had to be suppressed pursuant to statute.54 It is
extremely important to remember that independent and state-specific
rights guarantees can be found in a state’s statutory or common law.55
In 1978 Justice Utter dissented from a decision upholding “lewd
conduct” convictions for young women who had appeared topless in a
public park.56 He disagreed with the majority’s rejection of a defense
based on Washington’s Equal Rights Amendment,57 as well as its
statutory interpretation, concluding:
If the convictions of these students are allowed to stand, these
young women will carry with them throughout their lives a
record of conviction for lewd conduct, yet, everyone concerned
concedes that, but for the arbitrary definition of that crime which
seems to have been adopted by the City of Seattle, the appellants
neither acted nor intended to act in a “lewd” manner as that term
is used in reference to the other acts specified. Such a criminal
record, and the implication of a disposition to commit acts of
extreme vulgarity which necessarily accompanies it, may do
these appellants incalculable harm in future years.58
In 1984 Justice Utter, interpreting both the Washington State and
Federal Constitutions, held that a radio station could not be held in
contempt for broadcasting tape recordings that had been played in open
court.59 He enunciated a very early rationale for the primacy approach
where state courts evaluate state constitutional claims first:
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

In re Salary of the Juvenile Dir., 87 Wash. 2d 232, 552 P.2d 163 (1976).
Id., at 250–52, 552 P.2d at 173–75.
State v. Wanrow, 88 Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977).
88 Wash. 2d 221, 559 P.2d 548 (1977).
Id. at 233–34, 559 P.2d at 555.
WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 140–41.
City of Seattle v. Buchanan, 90 Wash. 2d 584, 610–11, 584 P.2d 918, 931 (1978).
WASH. CONST. art. XXXI, § 1.
Buchanan, 90 Wash. 2d at 611, 584 P.2d at 931.
State v. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d 364, 679 P.2d 353 (1984).
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Whether the prior restraint was constitutionally valid or invalid
should be treated first under our state constitution, for a number
of reasons. First, state courts have a duty to independently
interpret and apply their state constitutions that stems from the
very nature of our federal system and the vast differences
between the federal and state constitutions and courts. Second,
the histories of the United States and Washington Constitutions
clearly demonstrate that the protection of the fundamental rights
of Washington citizens was intended to be and remains a
separate and important function of our state constitution and
courts that is closely associated with our sovereignty. By turning
to our own constitution first we grant the proper respect to our
own legal foundations and fulfill our sovereign duties. Third, by
turning first to our own constitution we can develop a body of
independent jurisprudence that will assist this court and the bar
of our state in understanding how that constitution will be
applied. Fourth, we will be able to assist other states that have
similar constitutional provisions develop a principled,
responsible body of law that will not appear to have been
constructed to meet whim of the moment. Finally, to apply the
federal constitution before the Washington Constitution would
be as improper and premature as deciding a case on state
constitutional grounds when statutory grounds would have
sufficed, and for essentially the same reasons.60
He also made sure to note that the decision was based on “‘bona fide
separate, adequate, and independent [state constitutional] grounds.’”61
Therefore, the Washington State Supreme Court decision was final and
could not be taken to the United States Supreme Court because there was
no federal question.
Finally, he articulated his “dual analysis” approach in which he
analyzed federal constitutional law even though the case had already
been decided on state constitutional grounds:
First, our reasoning may be of aid to other courts with similar
problems who do not have state constitutional provisions similar
to ours and must rely on the appropriate federal constitutional
provisions and decisions. Second, although the federal cases in
no way influenced our decision under the Washington
Constitution, such a discussion demonstrates that federal

60. Id. at 373–74, 679 P.2d at 359; see also City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d 454, 456,
755 P.2d 775, 776 (1988).
61. Coe, 101 Wash. 2d at 377, 679 P.2d at 361 (citing Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983)).
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constitutional law also forbids a court to impose prior restraints
on the publication of information lawfully obtained at public
court proceedings.62
When his colleagues on the Washington State Supreme Court struck
down the use of state financial vocational assistance to a blind student
who wished to study to be a pastor under the First Amendment, Justice
Utter dissented both as a matter of federal constitutional law and also
state constitutional law, providing an exhaustive analysis of
Washington’s constitutional religion guarantees.63 The Court’s federal
constitutional ruling, however, was not based on an adequate and
independent state ground and was reversed by the United States
Supreme Court.64 On remand, the Washington State Supreme Court
reinstated its prior decision, but this time relied on the Washington
Constitution’s religion provisions.65 Again, Justice Utter dissented, first
arguing that the majority had not performed a proper Gunwall analysis
(the Court’s earlier articulated approach to state constitutional rights
claims),66 and then again delving very deeply into Washington’s
constitutional religion provisions.
In Sofie v. Fibreboard Corporation, Justice Utter struck down a “tort
reform” cap on noneconomic damages in personal injury or wrongful
death litigation.67 In this area, where the federal Seventh Amendment
right to jury trial has not been applied to the states,68 it is only state
constitutions that protect the right to jury trial in civil cases.69 Justice
Utter provided a detailed analysis of the Washington Constitution’s jury
trial guarantee, concluding that the challenged cap unconstitutionally
deprived the jury of its authority to award damages.70
In Foster v. Sunnyside Valley Irrigation Dist.,71 Justice Utter held that
a voting scheme in a special irrigation district where certain property
owners could not vote for the District’s board members violated the
62. Id. at 378, 679 P.2d at 361–62; see also Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d 456–57, 755 P.2d at 777.
63. Witters v. State, Comm’n for the Blind, 102 Wash. 2d 624, 630–31, 689 P.2d 53, 57 (1984),
rev’d 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
64. Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Serv. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, reh’g denied 475 U.S. 1091
(1986).
65. Writters v. State, Comm’n for the Blind, 112 Wash. 2d 363, 368, 771 P.2d 1119, 1121 (1989).
66. Id. at 373–74 (Utter, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text.
67. Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wash. 2d 636, 771 P.2d 711 (1989).
68. Id. at 644, 771 P.2d at 716.
69. See id.; Robert F. Williams, Foreword: Tort Reform and State Constitutional Law, 32
RUTGERS L.J. 897 (2001).
70. Sofie, 112 Wash. 2d at 668–69, 771 P.2d at 728.
71. 102 Wash. 2d 395, 687 P.2d 841 (1984).
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State constitution’s mandate of “free and equal” elections.72 This would
have been permissible under the United States Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Federal Constitution,73 but, as Justice Utter pointed
out, the federal Constitution does not contain a “free and equal”
elections clause and, therefore, the “Washington constitution goes
further to safeguard this right than does the federal constitution.”74 This
kind of careful textual comparison of state and federal constitutional
provisions has become a central feature of state constitutional analysis.
CONCLUSION
In 1995, after twenty-three years on the Washington State Supreme
Court, and despite his obvious love for teaching and judging, Justice
Utter resigned from the Court in protest of the continued use of capital
punishment in Washington.75 His numerous dissenting opinions from the
Court’s death penalty decisions had not proved to be enough for him; he
believed he could no longer participate in the judicial imposition of
capital punishment. Thus, we were all deprived of his likely future
contributions to state constitutional law as a sitting justice. Still, he has
left us a prodigious amount of highly influential material relating to
virtually all of the key issues that will continue to influence the area of
state constitutional law far into the future.

72. Id.
73. Foster, 102 Wash. 2d at 403–04, 687 P.2d at 846–47.
74. Id.
75. Robert F. Utter: Justice’s sailor, WASH. SECRETARY OF ST., https://www.sos.wa.gov/
legacyproject/oralhistories/RobertUtter/ [https://perma.cc/8SSK-CG7S] (last visited Oct. 18, 2015).

